我爱ASL，但我也爱Dean！本命设计师！

有人可以一起讨论战棋系统的模拟性，绝对是乐事，哪里需要劝架，哈哈。

又被G司机种草了

既然g大不得不说, 小弟也不客气.
TCS想表达的是什么?
一个排级游戏, IGOUGO, 射击主导, 有直射间射, 有LOS, 有Spotting.
有LOS, 要写计划书, 有内部分界, OOB没FOW, 游戏历史全程数天.
其C3受g大称赞. 那要讨论其C3的结构是什么. 计划书的内容, 机制, 可能结果.
继而道出战术战斗的进程, 那几天或几小时内应发生什么事情.
那要分析会发生什么. TCS表现出来的效果是否能被称为"真正战术棋"?
小弟认是显然不是, 因为从结果出发, 比它更贴近历史作战时点的二战棋已存在.
然后带出ASL不能模拟团级或长时间战斗, 因为缺少了TCS的一些元素.
是什么元素?
继而再说ASL在连级模拟范为内非真实. 主要表征是时间压缩.
而其中理由之一是火力与地形这两个乘托物出现误差.
还有没有其他理由? 小弟认为有, 但不是这两个, 而是别的.
而且是有方法解决.

围观大佬的辩论也是一种享受 学到了

Dean 是何许人, 小弟不以为然, 因其OCS其实很多不足.
* 半周内一整团被消灭是常态,
* 侦察兵没有HipShoot 加持,
* 火炮观察没有指挥限制,
* 比例棋但CRT结果却是差值.....
他不及Mark Herman 能从old school 中开凿出CDG 和Churhill 等新路.
LOB, TCS 仍旧是写东西.
系列每一代都要大改. 算子也不能重用.
勉强说 BCS 能开创新路, 用OBJ, Snafu, 众多DRM 来展现指挥摩擦力 ... 但仍有待加强.

Map 7. DEFENSE OF VILLAGE S NORTHWEST OF OLENINO (25-26 March 1942)
Before dawn on 26 March a reconnaissance patrol sent out by Company G returned from the forest bordering Village S to the north without having encountered enemy troops. The distance from the edge of the forest to the defense perimeter measured approximately 150 yards. Half an hour after the return of the German patrol 100 Russians suddenly emerged from the forest and attacked Company G at the northwestern part of the defense ring. The Russians participating in the attack were armed with submachineguns and moved on skis, which made the small force exceedingly mobile in the snow-covered terrain. In addition, every third man carried a frangible grenade in his pocket, presumably for the purpose of setting fire to the village. Several Russians literally blew up when their frangible grenades were struck by bullets and exploded. Because of the severe cold some of the German machineguns failed to function, and the Russians succeeded in penetrating the German positions.
Half an hour later Company G counterattacked in order to eliminate the penetration. The Russians fought tenaciously, and there was violent hand-to-hand combat. By 1200 Company G had recaptured the positions. Eighty-nine Russians were killed and nine, including two seriously wounded, taken prisoner. All of the attackers were NCO candidates who had been promised battlefield promotions if they captured Village S.
While Company G was mopping up the area, brief hand-to-hand fighting suddenly flared up at two points where prostrate Russians, suddenly coming to life, jumped to their feet and assaulted the German soldiers.
This example illustrates how effectively the Russian riflemen exploited the terrain when approaching the enemy, even in deep snow and extreme cold. The attack was conducted skillfully and silently, and fullest use was made of the element of surprise. The entire assault force rushed out of the forest and attacked in a single wave. However, when the surprise attack did not result in the immediate capture of the village but led to a struggle for the German positions, the operation lost its tactical value since the Russian unit had gone into battle without any support. Instead of breaking off the engagement and withdrawing, the Russians continued fighting until their entire force was wiped out.
This action, however, does not lend itself to generalization since a special Russian unit composed of noncommissioned officer candidates was involved. Except for the resistance offered to the German advance in the summer of 1941 by certain Russian elite formations, no other Russian units had fought so violently and tenaciously.
During World War II the training status of different Russian units showed such great variations that generalizations based on the performance of individual units are not permissible. As in any other army, there were both good and indifferent units among the innumerable divisions which opposed the Germans. Training courses at Russian service schools were conducted with great thoroughness, and even senior officers were subjected to the rigors of the ordinary training schedule. Training was not limited to the achievement of military proficiency; it was constantly overshadowed by political indoctrination designed to imbue every soldier with the ideological principles involved in the life-and-death struggle.
附图：

附上全部战斗过程详述。
其实再讨论下去已无意义，就用这个，作为本贴的最后一次回复吧。

Map 3. HILL 747 NORTHEAST OF RZHEV (15 November 1941)
Viehmann thereupon received orders to recapture the hill in a surprise attack to be launched at 2200. Regimental headquarters attached a medium mortar platoon and a light howitzer platoon to the company and promised artillery support. Viehmann formed three assault parties and moved them into jumpoff positions close to the Russian line under cover of darkness. The infantry company to the right was to divert the attention of the defending force at the time of the actual attack, while the unit to the left was to support the attack with its fire. Artillery and heavy weapons were to open fire on specified areas at prearranged flare signals.
The German assault parties occupied their jumpoff positions without attracting the * attention of the defending Russians. The party in the center, led by Viehmann, was only about 35 yards from the nearest Russian position. Close observation of the Russian defenses and the actions of individual soldiers indicated that a German attack was not anticipated. The Russian sentries were shivering from the cold and were by no means alert. Rations and supplies were being drawn. Not far from Viehmann's observation point a Russian detail was unloading furs and felt boots from a sled.
At 2200 the German assault parties, shouting loudly, broke into the Russian position. The attack confused the Russians, who dropped everything and attempted to make their way to the rear. Their escape, however, was prevented by the two assault parties that, at the beginning of the attack, had skirted either side of the hill and severed the Russian lines of communications. Unaware of the fighting, the Russian heavy weapons and artillery remained silent throughout the attack. When the signal flare went up, the German artillery and heavy weapons opened fire, laying a barrage on the Russian-held side of the hill. Two Russian machineguns covering each flank put up fierce resistance before being silenced in the hand-to-hand fighting.

GERMAN SENTRY using large wash tab to protect himself against icy wind.
After 45 minutes Hill 747 was completely in the hands of the Germans; their former MLR had been reoccupied and communications established with adjacent units. About 60 prisoners, 7 medium mortars, 5 heavy machineguns, 3 antitank guns, and large quantities of ammunition were taken. In the morning 70 Russian dead were found on the hill. Of the five German casualties, only one was severely wounded.
再附上一个夜战战例。还是同样的德军G连，在夜间突袭苏军阵地，德军中间突击排离最近的苏军仅有30m！从图上看，每个德军突击排只需要前进50-100m就能全占山头。整场行动苏军阵亡70人，被俘60人，德军仅5人负伤，无人阵亡。这么顺利的行动，依然花费了45分钟，相当于ASL 22.5个回合。

其实我觉得g司机和S2000两位大佬说的各有各的道理。正好借着两位的讨论，也谈一点我自己的看法。
首先作为一个从来没有玩过ASL也没有深入研究过其规则的人，无法对其评价太多，但在ASL这种班组的尺度，我认为其实已经超出了回合制的游戏机制的处理能力。尽管ASL设计了一系列临机反应的机制来弥补这一缺陷，但是仍然没法完全解决在这个尺度上事件发生的时间不同步的问题。从这个角度来说，其实去争论ASL一回合到底是2分钟还是10分钟并没有太大的意义。我个人觉得连排尺度应该是回合制能够比较有效运作的最小尺度了。低于这个尺度的非同步模拟确实更应该作为游戏来看待，而不是作战模拟。
至于TCS，我对规则相对有所了解，但也不是很深入，因此也只能发表一些浅见。我认为TCS最吸引人的地方确实就是它的OP SHEET，当然也是最有争议的地方。OP SHEET的吸引力在于迫使玩家像一个真正的营团级指挥官那样去思考，而且通过引入准备度等概念，对指挥系统造成的命令延迟作出了较好的模拟。这种沟通和指挥的延迟并不仅仅是二战时候3C不发达的结果，就算是现代战争的今天，在TCS所模拟的这一尺度上也是仍然存在的。当然这个系统只适合严肃和诚信的玩家，但反过来，仅仅追求游戏性的玩家也不必非要选择这个系列。
到了团营的尺度上，指令通讯的延迟的效果已经不太明显了，这时候chit pull的系统应该能够更好地反映战场突发事件带来的影响，还有由于C3不发达带来的混乱。回合制应该是在这个尺度上与即时同步制可以实现较为接近的效果了。
再到师旅的尺度上，这时的指挥官确实可以说是拥有类似于神一样的视角，因为这个尺度的时间够长（半周至一周），足以令所有信息沟通障碍及其它突发事件都能得到解决，因此传统兵棋的机制便足以胜任。而且回合制在这个尺度上相对即时同步制来说已经完全足以胜任，甚至有一定的优势。
就Wargaming而言师旅已经是作战或者战役的最大基本单位了。再往上到军和集团军的尺度，那么多半是进入了国家大战略的范畴了，不属于纯军事模拟，因此不属于这里的讨论范围之内。