The narrowness of this submission means that, if accepted, it would bring into existence a class of acquitted persons who would be unjustifiably singled out for unfairly discriminatory treatment. Those acquitted in the Circuit Court or the Special Criminal Court would be immune from appeal to any court, while the comparatively small number of people tried and acquitted in the Central Criminal Court would be liable to an appeal to the Supreme Court. While it is only a few of the more serious criminal offences that require to be tried in the Central Criminal Court, s. 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 , allows to be added to the indictment counts in respect of certain other offences which would normally be triable in the Circuit Court. It is possible, therefore, that out of the same set of circumstances one accused may be tried in the Circuit Court for a partiuclar offence and another accused may be tried in the Central Criminal Court for the same offence. If it turns out that both are acquitted — for the same offence, after identical modes of trial and on foot of essentially the same evidence — why should the person


he Director of Public Prosecutions would be free of all the statutory restrictions of the right of appeal.
Such an appeal would be unconstitutional because (a) it would be incompatible with what is necessarily encompassed by the guarantee of trial with a jury set out in Art. 38.5 ; (b) it would be in breach of the equality before the law guaranteed by Art. 40.1 ; and (c) it would violate the guarantee in respect of personal rights and protection from injustice given by Art. 40.3 .